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Personal injury claims arising from the use of asbestos have 
been a disaster for many in addition to those who were harmed by 
exposure to that product.  A lesson to be learned from the experience 
is that disasters of such a scale and such complex causes have 
radiating consequences that neither our judicial system nor our 
legislatures have been able to address seasonably.  Indeed, the 
failures call into question the utility of our “blame game” as a 
method of addressing the social and political issues of public health 
and work-related disabilities. 
One consequence of the crisis has been an epidemic of broad 
accusations.  On the one hand, asbestos claims have occasioned 
much adverse comment about the trial lawyers representing 
claimants.  On the other, an equal amount of venom has been 
directed at corporate management for its negligence in failing to 
protect consumers, workers, and their families from known hazards 
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resulting in long-delayed but enormous medical and economic 
harms.  Some of the criticism on both sides has been earned.  But 
responsibility lies broadly on the public and its elected 
representatives for their failure to respond in a timely and useful way 
to very serious problems confronted by thousands of businesses, 
millions of people, and by our judicial systems, both state and 
federal.  The Congress of the United States is particularly deserving 
of a failing grade. 
Virtually overlooked in the exchange of name-calling, 
however, has been the role of third parties sharing responsibility for 
the harm and receiving benefits associated with the risks to which 
the victims were exposed.  The state and federal governments 
equally failed to regulate Corporate America when they could have 
prevented the taking of profits at excessive risk and expense to 
employees and consumers.  Behind that governmental neglect are the 
American citizens and their congressmen who have failed to accept 
responsibility for the consequences of their disinclination to regulate 
business to prevent foreseeable harms to fellow citizens. 
Also, almost unnoticed is the revelation that the American 
legal system, as we have known it, simply does not work in matters 
presenting issues of fact requiring consideration of scientific 
evidence as complex as that needed to sort out the consequences of a 
plaintiff’s historic exposure to asbestos. This is especially so when 
similar but distinct issues are presented by the tens of thousands at a 
time.  The adaptations made to deal with such issues on the scale 
required are not acceptable to any sound notion of due process of 
law.  Having made this defense of the courts, it ought also be 
acknowledged that the judiciary has also at times neglected duties it 
could have performed. To make these points, a brief history of the 
subject is required. 
 
 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ASBESTOS 
 
A. The Advent of the Crisis: Prehistory to 1972 
 
Asbestos is a common mineral.  It was employed by ancient 
Greeks as “the magic mineral” shielding structures from fire because 
Summer 2007] ASBESTOS LESSONS 585 
 
 
of its resistance to heat.1  Its use over thousands of years prevented 
many misfortunes.  The substance occurs naturally in much of the 
world’s drinking water and its fibers can be found in a wide array of 
foods and commercial products such as tonics and mouthwashes.2  In 
the 1860s it was first commercially used in the United States as 
insulation.3  In 1931, a technique was developed for mixing the 
mineral in cement.  It came to be used in brake linings that might 
overheat.  And it was also widely used to cover pipes used to 
transmit heated air or fluids. 
The asbestos industry in the United States was long 
dominated by The Johns-Manville Corp.  It mined the material and 
fabricated it for a wide range of uses, primarily in the construction 
and maritime industries.  Much of its product was sold to 
intermediate companies for use in their products.  For example, in 
1880, Babcock & Wilcox began to design, construct, and sell large 
commercial boilers for use in power plants, factories, and ships.  
B&W used asbestos as a lining for its boilers to protect workers and 
equipment from the high temperatures generated and to assure 
thermal efficiency of its boilers.  Hundreds of thousands of 
American workers have at some time in their lives worked around a 
B&W boiler. 
As early as the 1930s, executives of The Johns-Manville 
Corp. were aware of an occupational hazard to miners and factory 
workers who were exposed to the material.4  The information was 
not a secret, but neither was it advertised.  It was optimistically 
assumed that the risk of inhalation by others, such as shipyard or 
construction workers, was negligible.  The Americans who were at 
work in the 1930s, and the executives of Johns-Manville, Babcock & 
                                                 
1. In 430 B.C. it was used in lamp wicks and denoted as Carpathian flax.  
Romans used it as a cremation garment to conserve the remains of persons of 
noble rank.  Charlemagne used it for a table cloth that could be washed in fire.  
NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH EDUC. & WELFARE, PUBL’N NO. 
78-1681,  ASBESTOS: AN INFORMATION RESOURCE 1 (Richard J. Levine ed., 1978). 
2. Andrew Churg, Non-neoplastic Diseases Caused by Asbestos, in 
PATHOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 213, 219-22 (Andrew Churg & 
Francis H. Y. Green eds., 1988); see also Mesothelioma SOS – Types of Asbestos, 
http://www.mesotheliomasos.com/asbestosTypes.php (last visited April 23, 2007) 
(listing additional uses of asbestos).  
3. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B. R. 710, 735 (Bankr. E. & 
S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
4. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY 
ON TRIAL 5, 112-13 (1985). 
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Wilcox or other firms, at that time, grew up expecting to die before 
they were sixty years old.5  The risk of infections that might affect 
the health of workers twenty or thirty years after an exposure—as 
was the case with asbestos-related injuries—was not a risk deemed 
worthy of serious attention by most people, even many of the 
workers themselves. 
And given the legal standards of the day, no business 
executive in 1940 had reason to think of the possibility of corporate 
liability for harms occurring decades into the future.  The law of torts 
was not then recognized in most states as a primary means of 
regulating business to discourage management from consciously 
taking risks with the health and safety of consumers and workers.  It 
was only after 1960 that tort law became recognized as public law,6 
and only then did American courts begin to interpret statutes of 
limitations as providing for a time to sue that begins to run only 
when the harm is discovered by the victim.7  A business executive 
who had decided in 1940 not to incur the risk to others of making or 
using asbestos could have been justifiably dismissed for cause by 
shareholders expecting diligent pursuit of profits. 
Among the consumers of asbestos, the largest by far was the 
United States Navy.  During World War II, the Navy stockpiled 
asbestos as a strategic resource needed to reduce the fire hazard on 
thousands of vessels constructed at that time for use in combat.  Four 
and a half million Americans were employed in shipyards at that 
time and were there exposed to the risk of inhalation of asbestos 
                                                 
5. See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, LIFE EXPECTANCY AT 
BIRTH, AT 65 YEARS OF AGE, AND AT 75 YEARS OF AGE, ACCORDING TO RACE AND 
SEX: UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS 1900-2001, 133 tbl. 27 (2003), available 
at http//www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/tables/2003/03hus027.pdf (showing average 
life expectancy in 1900 was 47 years, rising to 77 years at the end of the century). 
6. Leon Green, Tort Law as Public Law in Disguise [Installment I], 38 TEX. 
L. REV. 1 (1959); Leon Green, Tort Law as Public Law in Disguise [Installment 
II], 38 TEX. L. REV. 257 (1960).   See also LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) 
(describing the regulatory role of tort law); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 
(1941) (recognizing the regulatory role of tort law). 
7. Kim Marie Covello, Note, Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. and 
Statutes of Limitations in Latent-Injury Litigation: an Equitable Expansion of the 
Discovery Rule, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 471 (1983). 
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fibers.8  Many of those now dead died of causes to which their 
exposure to asbestos may have contributed.  The Navy was not 
unaware of risks, but apparently concluded that c’est la guerre.9  
Countless sailors who survived naval combat owed their survival to 
the use of asbestos.  But the shipbuilders on whom the compensating 
risks were imposed were not, alas, provided with the medical 
services afforded those in uniform through the Veterans’ 
Administration. 
Even back on land, whatever the long-term risk to workers 
and consumers from the use of asbestos, it was not unreasonably 
deemed to be more than offset by the reduction in the risk of harm to 
others by fire.  It is not unlikely that tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of Americans were spared a scorching death because of 
the use of asbestos in buildings and ships.  Whether on balance there 
would have been less suffering in America if asbestos had been 
taken off the market in 1920 when some knowledge of its possible 
effects on respiration first materialized is a question with no clear 
answer. 
Gradually it was revealed by medical research that the risks 
associated with the inhalation of asbestos fibers had been 
underestimated.  A cause of the underestimation was that the harm 
caused by the exposure was latent.  No one inhales a breath of 
asbestos and dies, or even loses breath.  In time, he or she might—
but might not—develop pleural fibrosis plaque, a thickening of the 
lung tissue visible to x-ray.  This was long thought to be merely a 
benign marker of exposure.10  However, even a person with that 
symptom might—but might not—develop asbestosis, an impairment 
of respiration.  That impairment could possibly occur in a few 
months, but more often would not occur for decades.  It might 
become a serious impairment of respiration, but generally the 
impairment experienced, if any, was no more serious than the 
impairment experienced by cigarette smokers. 
                                                 
8. JOSEPH A. ARTABANE & CATHERINE R. BAUMER, DEFUSING THE 
ASBESTOS LITIGATION CRISIS: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT 4-
21 (1986). 
9. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There A Need for 
an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1884-86 (1992) 
(explaining the government’s possible knowledge of the hazards of asbestos 
exposure and the perceived importance of asbestos to the war effort). 
10. Arnold R. Brody, Asbestos, in TOXICOLOGY OF THE RESPIRATORY 
SYSTEM 393, 394 (Robert A. Roth ed., 2000). 
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By 1935, there was published evidence that asbestos 
exposure correlated with lung cancer, and in 1955 a paper was 
published reporting that those exposed to asbestos fibers for twenty 
years were ten times more likely to contract lung cancer.11  But given 
the rarity of lung cancer, this was still a small if significant long-term 
health risk.  Further study in the 1960s revealed that this result was 
associated with smoking tobacco; the two exposures together created 
a magnified likelihood that the worker exposed to asbestos who also 
smokes would contract lung cancer.  It was also then discovered that 
over a period of 15 to 40 years, a person with asbestosis might 
contract a particularly deadly form of cancer, mesothelioma, a 
development that seems to have no correlation to smoking tobacco.12 
By 1970, it was reasonably clear that some workers exposed 
to asbestos would over a period of decades contract asbestosis and 
might be increasingly disabled by that condition, some might 
develop secondary medical problems associated with the asbestosis,  
some would develop lung cancers, and a few would develop 
mesothelioma. 
After 1973, the use of asbestos declined sharply as 
knowledge of the risks spread and as the new Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration called for its removal.  The substance was 
used in the construction of the lower floors of the World Trade 
Towers, but its use was discontinued as the structures were erected to 
their great heights.  Had the use of asbestos been continued as 
planned, the towers would have been slower to collapse.  However, 
as a result, the rescuers would have inhaled more of the injurious 
fiber and had their lives shortened accordingly.13  Additionally, the 
construction workers building the towers would also have had 
marginally shortened life expectancies.   
Notwithstanding the decline in the use of asbestos, the 
premier epidemiological study found that 27.5 million Americans 
                                                 
11. Richard Doll, Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers, 12 BRIT. 
J. INDUS. MED. 81 (1997). 
12. Approximately 20% of mesothelioma cases are not caused by asbestos 
fibers.  Michele Carbone et al., The Pathogenesis of Mesothelioma, 29 SEMINARS 
ON ONCOLOGY 2, 3-4 (2002). 
13. Kaream Fahim, Metro Briefing New York: Ground Zero Worker Dies of 
Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2006, at B1 (reporting that a paramedic who 
inhaled asbestos fibers on 9/11 died of mesothelioma in March 2006). 
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had by 1979 been exposed to the possible risk of inhaling asbestos 
fibers.14 
 
B. Asbestos Litigation, 1972-1991 
 
In 1972, a worker suffering from asbestosis sued a building 
materials manufacturer for failure to warn him of the danger 
associated with working with the material. 15  The evidence presented 
was that the defendant knew that work with asbestos carried risks but 
had not disclosed them to the plaintiff.  On that evidence, the worker 
won a $68,000 jury verdict.16  More and more workers formerly 
employed by Johns-Manville, and intermediate distributors of 
asbestos such as Babcock & Wilcox, were by then experiencing 
harms that may have been caused at least in part by the inhalation of 
asbestos fibers.  The use of asbestos had been so ubiquitous and the 
reactions so long delayed that an afflicted person may have been 
exposed to the fibers by any of numerous firms.   More claims began 
to be filed.  The lawyers filing them were invoking the system of 
legal risk management that had evolved in the preceding post-war 
decades. 
During the 1970s, about 950 cases were filed in federal 
courts and perhaps twice that many again in state courts.17  The 
number of filings in federal courts increased sharply in the early 
1980s; from 1980 to 1984 about 10,000 cases were filed in federal 
courts, leading one federal court to declare that it was “ill-equipped 
to handle this avalanche of litigation.”18  At the time of the utterance, 
it was scarcely an avalanche.  One also began to hear the term “mass 
tort,” a term suited to aviation disasters but perhaps misleading when 
applied to a mass of claims each of which is materially different 
from the next with respect to the question of causation as well as that 
of measuring individual damages.   
Most personal injury cases are settled, so that not more than 5 
out of 100 asbestos cases could be expected to conclude with a trial 
                                                 
14. William Nicholson et al., Occupational Exposure to Asbestos: Population 
at Risk and Projected Mortality 1980-2030, 3 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 259 (1982). 
15. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
16. Id. 
17. TERRENCE DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR 
36 (1988). 
18. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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on the merits.  The federal caseload in 1984 could have been handled 
with less than one additional asbestos trial every five years by each 
federal judge.  Then, from 1985 to 1989, 37,000 more asbestos cases 
were filed.  The annual total for 1990 rose to 13,000, a number that 
could result in an asbestos trial a year for each federal judge.  That 
placed a substantial demand on the available resources, but still not 
one that it was impossible for the judiciary to bear. 
These numbers take no account of the filings in state courts, 
which were surely more numerous, although there is no precise 
count.  By 1991, it was estimated that there were 115,000 asbestos 
personal injury claims pending in all American courts, state or 
federal.19  This was regarded as an appalling number.  But it was 
about four cases per trial judge, and given that most personal injury 
claims settle before trial on the merits, at least when such trials are 
imminent, it was not yet a totally unmanageable flood of litigation. 
Although most personal injury claims were settled before 
trial, the incentives to settle asbestos cases were magnified by the 
complexity of the cases thus presented for decision when the merits 
were reached.  Each and every individual claim presented a set of 
scientific questions bearing on the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s 
harm and the relationship of that harm to an exposure to the 
inhalation of asbestos fibers.  Such scientific issues would need to be 
resolved on the basis of testimony by medical and other scientific 
experts presented by adversary counsel.  It would not be extravagant 
to consume several days of trial to educate a jury and/or a trial judge 
on the intricacies of the science bearing on any individual claim.   
In addition, in each case there was a need to reconstruct 
events related to the plaintiff’s alleged exposure to the risk.  In most 
asbestos cases, those events occurred at least two, and often three or 
four, decades prior to the trial at which they were to be 
reconstructed.  Also in many cases, the plaintiff might have been 
exposed to risk at several different times by several different 
employers or suppliers.  Except in cases brought against Johns-
Manville, there was also likely to be an issue as to when the 
defendant acquired knowledge that asbestos fibers are dangerous to 
the health of those working on the defendant’s premises.  That issue 
often turned on the credibility of testimony of business executives 
                                                 
19. Suzanne L. Oliver & Leslie Spencer, Who Will the Monster Devour 
Next?, FORBES MAG., Feb. 18, 1991, at 75. 
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denying knowledge.20  And in some cases it might be possible to 
prove that the defendant was reckless in failing to disclose the risk, 
and might thus be held to additional account.  Finally, there was in 
each case an issue of damages.  How severely, if at all, is the 
plaintiff actually disabled?  How does the disability affect his or her 
life and work? And how should his or her suffering be compensated?  
The resolution of the latter issues requires a trier of fact to assess the 
veracity of the witnesses, bearing on each individual plaintiff’s 
suffering and economic loss. 
These difficult factual issues involving the interface of law 
and science intersect with uncertainties of substantive law.  Can a 
firm such as Johns-Manville, that mines and manufactures asbestos, 
be held to account for all the harms?  Should it be a defense that 
millions of Americans were protected by its product?  What of a firm 
such as Babcock & Wilcox that builds boilers according to 
specifications provided by the United States Navy—were they 
responsible for knowing of the risk and informing those who worked 
with or around their boilers?  Is it a defense—or at least a partial 
defense—in a lung cancer case, that the plaintiff chose to inhale 
cigarette smoke that may have been the primary cause of his 
sickness?  Or can a tobacco company that sold him cigarettes be 
made to pay some or all the costs? Where there are multiple possible 
causes of the disability, may liability be apportioned among 
numerous defendants, or must the plaintiff prove that the 
wrongdoing of a particular defendant is the predominant cause?  
What is the liability of a parent corporation for claims against a 
subsidiary that were latent at the time the subsidiary was acquired?  
What is the applicable statute of limitations, and when should the 
period of limitation be deemed to have commenced?  Are plaintiffs 
entitled to compensation for “pain and suffering” associated with the 
fear of illness resulting from the knowledge that their exposure to 
asbestos may in the future result in serious illness or death?  All 
these legal issues are governed by the tort law of each state.  In many 
states, the questions may have no clear answers or the answers may 
depend on the factual circumstances.  Moreover, because the states 
do not answer the questions in the same way, there is a ubiquitous 
conflict of laws issue as to which state law ought be applied to 
                                                 
20. A defense lawyer denotes the resolution of the issue as a “swearing 
match.” Richard O. Faulk, Asbestos Litigation in State Courts: Why the System is 
Broken and Some Suggestions for Repair, 71 U.S.L.W. 2323, 2323 (2002). 
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resolve any of these specific legal questions in a particular individual 
case. 
Because the factual and legal issues presented were so 
complex and their resolutions so difficult to foretell, parties were 
especially eager to avoid trials on the merits.21  But even in cases 
settled without trial, legal costs were very high because of the 
lawyers’ need for access to scientific evidence as a basis for 
negotiated settlements.  It was unsurprising when a 1982 study 
measuring the costs of dispute resolution concluded that for every 
dollar reaching an asbestos claimant, $1.59 was paid to lawyers and 
medical examiners.  The National Association of Manufacturers 
would in 2006 plausibly up that estimate to $2.38.22  For smaller 
asbestosis claims, the portion actually received was much lower, 
while for the larger mesothelioma cases, the portion of the cost paid 
by the defendant that was received by the plaintiff was higher.23 
If parties were not eager to try these complex cases, the 
judiciary was even less inclined to do so.  There was growing and 
legitimate concern that the outcomes of trials seemed almost random 
with similarly situated plaintiffs receiving radically divergent 
compensation depending on factors such as (1) the persuasiveness of 
particular expert witnesses; (2) the degree of concern of the judge 
and jury for the personal tragedy faced by particular plaintiffs; and 
(3) differences in the law of the jurisdiction in which the cases were 
tried and decided.  Asbestosis cases indeed resembled a lottery. 
 
C. After 1991: Court Management, Delay, and 
Resolution en Masse 
 
By the year 2002, 730,000 claims had been filed alleging 
personal injuries caused by the use of asbestos.24 Approximately 
                                                 
21. 95.3% of the cases filed were settled before trial, and another 0.9% after 
commencement of the trial.  JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATIONS IN ASBESTOS 
LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 19 (1984). 
22. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Hearing on S. 
32774 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 41 (2006) (statement of 
John Engler, President, National Association of Manufacturers).  
23. KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 21, at 89-91. 
24. 150 CONG. REC. S4078 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch). 
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8,400 businesses had been named as defendants in asbestos cases.25  
A total of $54 billion had been paid to claimants.   In each of the last 
three years, over 100,000 additional claims were filed.  This has 
occurred despite the fact that the usage of asbestos declined 
precipitously in the 1970s and was substantially terminated by 1980.  
It is estimated that another million claims will be filed and that the 
total cost to settle them all will reach $300 billion unless Congress 
takes belated action to somehow reduce the costs. 26 
To date, fewer than two thousand out of almost a million 
asbestos cases have been tried on the merits.27  By 1991, many 
courts, dissatisfied with the fact that some plaintiffs were not settling 
and were seeking trials, began to insist on settlement.  Particularly in 
the federal courts, the idea that it was the business of trial judges to 
conduct trials—perhaps especially long and puzzling trials—to 
decide cases on their merits, gave way to a new professional 
morality.  The federal judiciary began to practice what was styled as 
case management, designed to achieve economy by exercising 
tighter judicial control over pretrial proceedings, in the hope of 
inducing a higher rate of settlement.  Some federal judges came to 
regard the conduct of a civil trial not as the core business of their 
profession, but as an event marking a professional shortcoming of 
the judge.  It may also have been a factor in the seemingly special 
reluctance of federal judges to decide asbestos cases on the merits 
that complex issues of state law were presented, issues that federal 
courts were not commissioned to resolve.  It may also have mattered 
that the product was off the market, so that no decision of any court 
could be expected to impact others than the parties themselves. 
For all these reasons, it became increasingly difficult in many 
federal courts to get an individual asbestos case to trial.  While most 
asbestos plaintiffs were not eager to go to trial, they did need a firm 
trial date to induce defendants to settle their claims.  Lawyers 
representing plaintiffs therefore began to contrive to keep their cases 
in state courts and out of federal courts.  This was emphatically so 
after 1991 when all the cases pending in federal courts were 
                                                 
25. 150 CONG. REC. S4080 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch). 
26. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND 
COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT (2002). 
27. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 26, at 56. 
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consolidated before a single judge.28  Such a consolidation was 
authorized for the purpose of conducting more efficient pretrial 
proceedings.29  Given that most of the scientific evidence would be 
specific to an individual case, it was at best unlikely that a single 
transferee judge could materially diminish the cost or the delay 
associated with pretrial preparation of an asbestos case.  While the 
federal judges ordering the transfers may have thought otherwise at 
the time, the transferee judge had no authority to conduct a mass 
trial,30 even if that were imaginable. 
At that time in 1991, it was reported by one observer that the 
backlogs in federal courts would not get to trial for decades.  
Another found that if asbestos cases were individually tried, it would 
require 150 years to decide them all.31  While these forecasts were 
extreme exaggerations, there was no doubt that the single transferee 
judge was not expected to decide any of the cases on the merits.  
Additional facilities would be needed if these complex cases were 
each to be individually tried, if ever they were to be tried.32  
Meanwhile, asbestos claims pending in federal court were on 
permanent hold.  The transferee forum was merely a place for 
asbestos cases to languish. 
Similar dilatory devices were employed by the courts of 
many states whose judges likewise sought to avoid deciding the 
cases on their individual merits.  Many judges were especially slow 
to put asbestos cases on the docket for trial. 
But when it was at last discerned that some defendants were 
exploiting the delay by refusing settlements until cases were set for 
trial (which was apparently forever), more than a few state court 
judges began consolidating asbestos cases for common trial.  If 
trying one asbestos case was almost too much to ask of lawyers, 
judges, and jurors, what could be said for trying six or a dozen cases 
simultaneously in a single continuous hearing?  This was a device 
for terrorizing recalcitrant defendants and it resulted in some very 
                                                 
28. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422-424 
(J.P.M.L. 1991).   
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). 
30. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 
(1998). 
31. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 140 
(1995). 
32. Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of the Never-Ending 
Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1 (2001). 
Summer 2007] ASBESTOS LESSONS 595 
 
 
generous settlement offers.  The generosity of these settlements, on 
the basis of limited examination of their merits conducted in the 
settlement process, had the effect of drawing more plaintiffs into the 
pool of claimants.33  This device of coercive judicial consolidation 
was forsaken by many courts.34  The Supreme Court of West 
Virginia in 2001 allowed a trial judge in that state to consolidate 
twelve thousand asbestos claims for a single trial, an event that 
obviously cannot happen, but which is a sufficiently appalling 
prospect to force settlements not based on scrutiny of the merits of 
the individual claims.35  A secondary consequence of this device is to 
concentrate the filing of claims in those jurisdictions employing it.  
Claimants who filed their claims in West Virginia seemed likely to 
be compensated more generously than those who were so poorly 
advised that they filed their claims in a forum in which their case 
might actually come to trial. 
 
 
II. LEGISLATION CONSIDERED 
 
Numerous schemes were advanced to relieve the problem of 
docket congestion by federal legislation.  Most envisioned some kind 
of administrative agency that would devise a formula for even-
handed management of the claims.36  Such an agency or facility 
might resemble the industrial accident compensation boards sitting in 
many states to hear and decide a range of similar matters.  Its judges 
might be expected to acquire a measure of expertise about the 
science employed to resolve the issues of fact raised regarding 
causation and damages.  It might be directed and empowered to 
categorize the cases so that like cases would receive like treatment.  
But hearings to consider such legislative reforms led nowhere,37 as 
Congress lacked the will to impose any solution on the problem.  
One reason was that Corporate America was unable itself to agree on 
                                                 
33. See generally Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass 
Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1943 (2000) (discussing mass torts and class actions). 
34. See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Tort for Judges, 73 TEX. 
L. REV. 1821, 1838-41 (1995) (discussing judicial approaches to mass torts). 
35. The Supreme Court of the United States declined to review this decision.  
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003). 
36. See Brickman, supra note 9, at 189 (advocating administrative remedy). 
37. The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. 
(1999). 
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a solution.  Another was that plaintiffs’ lawyers were likewise 
divided. There were those with clients suffering grave mesothelioma 
and those suffering minor respiratory impediments. There were those 
whose clients’ sicknesses were manifest and immediate and those 
whose clients’ injuries consisted of symptoms indicative of the 
possibility of future suffering and disability and, finally, those who 
sought compensation for the fear that they would suffer in the 
future.38  A third reason for the impasse was the blindness of 
Congress to the responsibility of the public to bear a substantial part 
of the blame and the cost. 
In 2005, the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act was 
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee.  The bill would have 
established a $140 billion National Asbestos Trust Fund, managed 
by an Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation within the 
Department of Labor, with fixed levels of compensation for different 
categories of asbestos victims.39  The fund if established would have 
been assembled from diverse bankrupt estates supplemented by 
annual contributions from firms and insurers facing liabilities.  In 
return, contributors would have been exempt from further claims.   
The Director of the Congressional Budget Office expressed doubt 
that the fund was adequate to meet the obligations undertaken and 
forecast that the government would end up holding the bag.40  
Economist Charles Bates predicted that the future claims on the fund 
would equal $300 billion.41  The difficulty of forecasting the future 
caseload was manifest.  The bill did not pass the Senate.   
Other schemes for resolving the asbestos crisis were also 
proposed.  Senator Nickles called for reforming the federal law to 
limit the number of asbestos claims.  His proposal would have 
imposed strict medical criteria whereby a person would have to 
                                                 
38. Geoffrey Hazard, The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1996 
(2000).  Hazard suggests a legislative solution to the problem.  Id. at 1916.  Other 
comments on the issue include Linda Mullenix, Back to the Futures: Privatizing 
Future Claims Resolution, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1919 (2000) and Diane Wood, 
Commentary on the Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1933 (2000). 
39. Recent Developments in Assessing Future Asbestos Claims under the Fair 
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) 
(statement of Sen. Specter, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary). 
40. Id. at 115.  
41. Recent Developments in Assessing Future Asbestos Claims under the Fair 
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 115-17 (2005) 
(statement of Sen. Specter, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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prove asbestos related injuries before filing a claim.  Imposing strict 
medical criteria might or might not reduce the number of claims, but 
splitting the trials would spare courts the need to hear proof of 
damages in cases in which it was determined that there was no 
compensable injury.  Additionally, his proposal would toll the statute 
of limitations to protect the rights of people who exhibit signs of 
asbestos-related disease but develop illnesses in the future.42  
Alternatively, his proposal advocated nationalizing Texas’ scheme of 
establishing inactive dockets: all asbestos related claims would be 
relegated to inactive dockets and shifted to an active docket only 
after a claim is certified to involve an asbestos related illness 
according to established medical criteria.43  However, because of the 
ever-present political differences in Congress, these solutions, 
whatever their merit or demerit, have remained unavailable on a 
national scale. 
Variations on the Texas scheme have been enacted in other 
states.  They have served to reduce the number of claims, at least for 
the moment.  In 2006, Senator Specter sought to revive the FAIR Act 
aimed at securing the support of those concerned about the cost of 
paying claims that are premature in the sense that the claimant is not 
yet physically disabled but is concerned about his or her future 
prospects of health.44  His draft would defer consideration of their 
claims until there is a certified disability, somewhat in the manner of 
the laws enacted in Texas and other states.  Still, insurers were 
concerned that some claimants might be “double-dipping” by 
making claims on workmen’s compensation funds for the same 
injuries compensated by the trust fund.45  Eric Green, testifying as an 
expert on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms established by 
bankruptcy courts, affirmed that that system was working reasonably 
well.  He noted that the Halliburton Company had gone through the 
bankruptcy process and then prospered, so that it—in the end—paid 
                                                 
42. 150 CONG. REC. S4258 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Nickles). 
43. George Scott Christian & Dale Craymer, Texas Asbestos Litigation 
Reform: A Model for the States, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 981, 999-1000 (2003). 
44. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th 
Cong. (2006). 
45. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 82 (2006) (statement of Edmond F. 
Kelly, Chairman, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.). 
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off all claims in full for the amounts set in the bankruptcy 
proceeding.46 
No serious consideration has been given to any proposal to 
impose any of these costs on federal taxpayers.  This is so even 
though the asbestos problem bore a resemblance to the Black Lung 
Disease experienced by coal miners.  The United States had 
undertaken to fund care for those afflicted with that illness.47  The 
black lung problem was much smaller in scale and it was 
immediately obvious that the coal companies could not bear the cost.  
Perhaps these differences explain the inability of Congress to accept 
even partial financial responsibility for the disaster so that the loss 
might be distributed to those who have benefited from the use of 
asbestos. 
 
 
III. SOLUTIONS DEVISED BY JUDGES AND PARTIES 
 
Meanwhile, courts and parties, left largely to their own 
devices by Congress for thirty years, sought to fashion systems for 
mass resolution of these diverse individual claims.  The West 
Virginia case previously referred to was a parody of other forms of 
aggregation.  The first of these aggregative responses was the filing 
of a petition in bankruptcy by the Johns-Manville Corp.  As noted, 
there was evidence that Manville executives had some knowledge of 
the risks that they had not shared with the public, and they were in 
fact the producers of most of the material used in the United States.  
And most of the cases filed before 1982 were filed against the Johns-
Manville Company.48  It was that year that Manville filed its 
bankruptcy petition.  Accordingly, all asbestos claims then pending 
against it were stayed.  The viable assets of the firm (including the 
trade name) were sold and the proceeds placed in trust for the 
                                                 
46. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 82 (2006) (statement of Eric Green, 
Founder, Principle, Resolution, LLC). 
47. See ALAN DERICKSON, BLACK LUNG: ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC HEALTH 
DISASTER 143-182 (1998) (describing the process by which coal miners afflicted 
with black lung disease obtained public benefits). 
48. Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Claims Management Act of 1991: A 
Proposal to the United States Congress, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1894 n.13 
(1992); see also Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(discussing high number of suits to which Manville had been a party). 
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claimants, those with pending claims and those anticipated in the 
future.49  The firm thus remained in business while its ownership 
changed.  It was envisioned that the trust would settle individual 
claims in accordance with a formula established by it with the 
approval of the court. 
This was a radical solution.  Most corporate executives 
understandably dread bankruptcy.  It is, however, now often the 
result that an enterprise will survive bankruptcy in a reorganized 
form, as did Johns-Manville, and that management will survive even 
while the shareholders’ interests are wiped clean.  So far as appears, 
no managers have been the object of shareholders’ derivative suits 
for their failures to protect shareholders from liability for asbestos 
claims, although if management was truly negligent, it would seem 
that the managers should not be allowed to pass all the loss on to the 
ill-served shareholders. 
Many of the firms in bankruptcy as a result of asbestos 
claims remain, like Johns-Manville, profitable while the bankruptcy 
stops claimants dead in their tracks, at least while it is determined 
that there is a net worth to be divided among them.  As Eric Green 
observed, some like Halliburton have managed to revive and pay off 
all claims in full.50  Never mind the former shareholders. 
Similar aggregation could also be achieved outside 
bankruptcy by means of cooperation among plaintiffs’ lawyers.  
Asbestos cases are likely to be referred from the lawyer having a 
direct relationship with a plaintiff to another lawyer who specializes 
in the settlement of asbestos cases.  The lawyer or lawyers to whom 
the cases are referred can then speak of an inventory of claims that 
can be simultaneously presented to the defendant and settled 
together.  In the 1980s, lawyers representing plaintiffs discovered 
that corporate managements could be intimidated into more 
favorable settlements if their claims could be aggregated so that 
settlement conversations would center on sums of such magnitude 
that they might affect the market value of shares.51  A problem with 
                                                 
49. MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville, 837 F.2d 89, 89 (2d Cir. 1988). 
50. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 82 (2006) (statement of Edmond F. 
Kelly, Chairman, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.). 
51. DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE 
OF MASS TOXIC TORT LITIGATION (1985); Deborah Hensler, As Time Goes By: 
Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1912-13 
(2002).  This affect had been earlier discovered by antitrust lawyers, leading one 
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these settlements en masse was that they did not always prescribe the 
amount to be received by each member of the lawyer’s inventory of 
plaintiffs.  Thus, either the lawyer had to divide the take among his 
or her clients, a task presenting a direct conflict of interest, or some 
form of alternative dispute resolution was needed to make the 
division, thereby transferring the cost of defending claims from the 
defendant to the plaintiffs collectively.  “Claims facilities” relieved 
judges and defendants’ lawyers of workloads and their tasks were 
performed by other lawyers whose services were not necessarily less 
costly.  Alternatively, in some cases a “reverse auction” occurred, 
pitting plaintiffs’ lawyers in competitive bidding to be the lawyer 
who settles a mass of cases and shares in the proceeds.52  In all its 
forms, aggregation complicates the ethical responsibilities of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.53 
A disincentive to business management considering such a 
deal has been the prospect that future claimants, whose numbers are 
unknown, would demand treatment equal to that afforded in the 
previous settlement.  Managers hoped for global peace that would 
bring closure to their liability for asbestos claims and enable their 
firms to concentrate on the future rather than the distant past.  Not 
only does global peace serve the interest of long-term investors, but 
it is also favored by investment managers who are acutely sensitive 
to swings in the prices of shares in which they have invested.  And it 
is especially remunerative to corporate managers who make the 
settlement decisions if they are compensated, as most are, with 
options to purchase shares in the companies that can be sold at a 
profit only if the share price rises in the short term.   
                                                                                                                
observer to denote the practice as “legalized blackmail.”  Milton Handler, The Shift 
from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 9 (1971). 
52. The device is explained more fully by Justin Scheck, The Gritty World of 
the Reverse Auction Spreads, NAT’L L.J., July 25, 2005, at 11. 
53. See generally Carrie Menkel Meadow, Ethics of the Settlement of Mass 
Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (1995) (arguing 
that the ethical complications of their settlements demand changes in the legal 
system beyond professional ethics rules); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You 
Choose: The Role of Plaintiff’s Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 1465 (1998) (exploring differences between the rules governing the 
settlement process for consensual and non-consensual litigation groups); Lester 
Brickman, Lawyers’ Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New World of 
Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENV. L. & POL’Y REV. 243 (2001) 
(attacking “perverse” financial incentives of lawyers in aggregate litigation). 
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This is so, in part, because global peace facilitates use of an 
accounting principle that allows separate measurement of “trailing 
income” against future income.  Because accountants have learned 
this not so subtle distinction, the costs of global settlements can be 
charged against past income to show that the business was less 
profitable in the past than was thought by earlier investors, but the 
future income is more secure as projected.  That results in keeping 
the share prices high.  If cases are settled one at a time, the liability 
remains a drag on future income and share prices fall.  This is a 
consequence directly affecting the personal wealth of corporate 
managers who are paid with stock options entitling them to buy 
shares in the not-too-distant future at today’s price, with the gain to 
be taxed at the lower rates applied to capital gains. 
Perhaps for these reasons, Congress has, with a gentle touch 
of public generosity, added incentives favoring such settlements by 
their treatment for tax purposes.  The Internal Revenue Code permits 
defendants who make payments into a settlement fund to deduct 
them at the time of the fund’s establishment rather than when (or if) 
funds are distributed to claimants.54  Other provisions assure 
favorable treatment to those who buy and sell (factor) “structured 
settlements,” which involve a series of payments rather than a lump 
sum to an injured party.55  
To facilitate global settlements bringing the global peace for 
which managers were willing to pay premium prices while avoiding 
the complexities of bankruptcy proceedings, creative lawyers and 
judges fashioned the limited-fund class action.56  This was primarily 
a defensive use of a device designed for the benefit of plaintiffs.57  
The corporate defendant reached agreements with plaintiff’s counsel 
on the size of the fund that it could afford to provide and then 
                                                 
54. See generally Richard B. Risk, Jr., A Case for the Urgent Need to Clarify 
Tax Treatment of a Qualified Settlement Fund Created for a Single Claimant, 23 
VA. TAX REV. 639 (2004) (arguing that Congress did not intend for the judicial 
doctrine of economic benefit to apply to a designated or qualified settlement fund 
created for the benefit of a single claimant).  
55. See Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort 
Claims Has Arrived 4 WIS. L. REV. 859, 882 (2002) (“[D]efendants save 
approximately 20-25% by settling with a structure rather than a lump-sum.”). 
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) was invoked. 
57. Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in 
Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 595 (1997). 
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established a trust similar to that created by the bankruptcy court.58  
Two such schemes reached the Supreme Court of the United States 
and were set aside for failure to provide adequate protection of 
individual claimants who did not consent to them, especially future 
claimants whom the parties sought to bind to a judgment of the court 
that would afford the defendant “global peace” against future 
claims.59  In the latter of these cases, the Court accurately observed 
that American courts have been besieged by an “elephantine mass of 
asbestos cases [that] defies customary judicial administration.”  That 
observation was reiterated by the Court in 2003.60 
When the limited fund class action encountered these 
obstacles, the experts returned to the law of bankruptcy for solace.  
Congress had, in 1994, taken action explicitly to authorize the 
bankruptcy court to protect the reorganized firm from future 
claimants, provided it made arrangements to treat future claimants on 
equal terms with prior claimants.61  To provide equal treatment, the 
bankruptcy court needed a means of measuring future claims, 
something the Manville Trust and others had been unable to find, 
given the enormous diversity in the physical conditions of the 
claimants.62  Modern science has simply not been up to that task.  
Partial payments were made to present claims, but it then appeared 
that the number of future claims had been grossly underestimated.  
Perhaps this should not have been surprising, given that at least 27 
million Americans had been exposed, and a significant percentage 
had a physical symptom that might have been associated with 
exposure at some time past, a symptom that might entitle them to a 
measure of compensation now, while more accurately assessed 
compensation would be later barred by the bankruptcy decree.  
                                                 
58. For an account, see Francis E. McGovern, Claims Resolution Facilities 
and the Mass Settlement of Mass Tort, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (1990). 
59. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).  A novel approach to the future claims problem 
was approved by the district court In re Diet Drugs; the approach called for 
conferring on each member of the class a right resembling the “put option” 
familiar to investment traders and entitled the class member to invoke a right to 
treatment or compensation at a future time.  In re Diet Drugs, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 12275 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000). 
60. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 538 U.S. at 166; cf. Metro N. Commuter R.R. v. 
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997). 
61. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000). 
62. Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 
104 YALE L.J. 367, 382-391 (1994). 
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Notwithstanding these problems, sixteen large corporations had filed 
bankruptcy petitions by 2000 and scores more followed.  Most 
remain in business and many prosper for the benefit of claimants 
rather than shareholders. 
To protect their members whose claims were threatened with 
foreclosure before they were ripe, labor unions and some lawyers 
began engaging in aggressive claim solicitation campaigns designed 
to multiply the number of filed cases, thereby increasing the pressure 
on defendants to settle cases wholesale.63  Once a person was 
informed of the presence of pleural plaque, a condition that is itself 
inconsequential, he or she was effectively informed of the injury and 
was obliged under the law of most states to file a claim or else be 
barred from filing when and if the injury became consequential.  As 
noted, some states have sought to solve this problem by creating 
registries on which individuals having such a condition could be 
listed, with the effect that they would not be barred by the statute of 
limitations if they were later physically disabled by the condition.64 
In the 1990s, an increasing percentage of the claims filed 
were presented by workers who had not been employed in any of the 
industries in which asbestos exposure was severe.65  Their exposures 
to the inhalation of fibers were more limited.  For example, some 
encountered asbestos only as an ingredient in the ceiling tiles at their 
place of employment, which might have been a local grocery store.  
Because the severity of the injury is related to the degree of 
exposure, these claims are even less likely to represent real future 
injuries, but science cannot say for sure in any individual case.  Also, 
because the law of most states allows plaintiffs to recover for mental 
anguish associated with physical injury, many plaintiffs with mild 
cases of asbestosis that are not at all debilitating may be entitled to 
compensation for the mental anguish resulting from the fear that a 
cancer may develop at some future time.  The Supreme Court has 
now applied that principle to railroad workers seeking compensation 
under the federal law governing their rights.66  The result of these 
holdings is that thousands of plaintiffs with slight or even non-
existent injuries advance claims that compete with the claims of 
                                                 
63. Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in 
Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 564 (1992). 
64. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 26, at 23. 
65. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 26, at 46. 
66. Norfolk & W. Ry Co., 538 U.S. at 166. 
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plaintiffs having serious injuries in the distribution of the assets of 
the many firms made insolvent by their liabilities for asbestos 
injuries.67  It is this problem that the state laws referred to seek to 
address.   
Indeed, a new industry emerged to advertise its willingness to 
tell people whether they might have million dollar lungs; litigation-
screening companies compete with mobile x-ray vans that offer free 
chest x-rays to anyone willing to sign an agreement retaining a 
lawyer with whom the screening company has a relation.68  If a 
symptom is detected, the “patient” is informed and a claim is 
advanced to secure compensation for the emotional injury associated 
with the non-debilitating condition that might ripen into an illness.  
Such claims become valuable when they are aggregated in sufficient 
numbers to intimidate management. 
The adjudication of future claims as envisioned by the 1994 
revision of the bankruptcy law engages the bankruptcy court, like the 
class action trustee, in the sublime task of compensating victims for 
the enlarged chances that they may develop serious illnesses at some 
indeterminate future time.  This is essentially a task of risk 
assessment of the sort the insurance industry rather than a law court 
is usually employed to perform.  But insurance companies are not 
lined up in hope of securing that employment. 
Can courts reckon the odds as well or better than insurance 
companies?  Of course, many firms have long ago purchased liability 
insurance to protect them against such future claims.  Unfortunately, 
the risks were seldom if ever accurately assessed.  As noted, the 
number of claims was vastly underestimated.  As a result, many 
firms that used asbestos in one way or another were underinsured.  A 
recent estimate is that insurers will ultimately bear about sixty 
percent of the loss; that share will be equally divided between 
American insurers and non-U.S. insurers.69  And some insurance 
companies are themselves facing risks of insolvency.   
                                                 
67. Francis McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 1721 (2002); see also Roger Parloff, Infinite Liability, AM. LAW. 178 (Oct. 
2002); Lawyers Catch Asbestosis, AM. LAW. 170 (April 2002). 
68. Robert J. Samuelson, Asbestos Fraud, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at 
A25.  See WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION 
ELITE THREATENS AMERICA’S RULE OF LAW 181-208 (2003) (indicting the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers). 
69. Bob Van Voris, Asbestos Suits: No End in Sight, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 27, 
2001. 
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Another troubling question raised by Peter Schuck is 
whether, when a bankrupt estate is not adequate to meet all claims, 
funds should be paid to those not injured, but who might be, at the 
expense of those who have been gravely injured.70  The Act under 
consideration in 2005 would assure those gravely injured of 
compensation, but those whose injuries are not yet consequential 
may be at risk if $140 billion is spent before his or her claim ripens. 
 
 
IV. SOME LESSONS TO BE DERIVED 
 
There are several lessons to be learned from this tragic tale. 
First, it is unlikely that many readers could disagree with the 
observation of the Supreme Court that the asbestos problem cried out 
for a legislated solution.   Such a solution should have been 
forthcoming in 1970, and the United States should have borne much 
or all of the cost.  The American policy of making business pay for 
the consequences of its innate indifference to the welfare of workers 
and consumers, may be a good idea in general—as a means of 
encouraging safer practices—but it was not a policy that could be 
usefully pursued with respect to asbestos.  By the time the courts 
were involved, the use of asbestos was already in decline and did not 
need to be discouraged.  Moreover, the alleged transgressions of 
business were in this instance motivated by the competing purpose to 
prevent harms caused by fire.  And many of the users of asbestos 
were substantially innocent of full knowledge of the risks for which 
they are asked to pay.  The responsibility was a public responsibility, 
not one rightly imposed on business.  Both Congress and the 
Executive Branch flunked that test. 
Second, we ought to agree that premature adjudication is not 
a satisfactory form of litigation.  As has long been understood, there 
is a time to decide a case.  A court established to apply law to facts 
cannot consistently with that mission measure and compensate harms 
before they have matured into real injuries with symptoms that can 
be examined and resulting disabilities that can be reasonably 
evaluated as to their extent and cause.  Courts engaging in that 
practice are just guessing and hence failing to protect their integrity 
as institutions of law.  Although a claim for compensation for the 
                                                 
70. Schuck, supra note 63, at 560-67. 
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anxiety caused by knowledge of increased risk of future harm can be 
said to present a case or controversy within the meaning of Article 
III of the Constitution of the United States,71 the longstanding 
judicial reluctance to resolve hypothetical cases72 is rooted in 
considerations that are not irrelevant to cases in which courts are 
asked to guess about future cases.  It follows that global peace in 
many, and perhaps most, mass tort cases of the asbestos sort is not a 
goal that can be prudently pursued by a court of law, however 
attractive that objective may be to accountants and executives.  
Whatever its limitations, the insurance industry, not the courthouse, 
is the place to look for global peace. 
Third, we might learn from this experience the risks of the 
fashion presently prevalent in the federal courts that treats 
dispositions of disputes on their merits as professional failures by the 
judges.  In asbestos cases, case management has diminished the 
threat that an imminent trial on the merits poses to parties with weak 
claims or defenses and thereby has encouraged their assertion.  The 
evidence thus supports Judith Resnik’s insistence that it is not the 
work of a judge to coerce parties either by imposing endless delay on 
the plaintiff or unmanageable aggregation on the defendant.73  While 
it does appear that there are now too many asbestos claims to resolve 
each on its merits in a court of law, this was far from apparent at the 
time that extraordinary measures were being taken to avoid trying 
the cases on the merits.  One is left to wonder how the march of 
events might have differed if each asbestos claim advanced in the 
1980s had been given a prompt hearing and decision on the merits as 
each of them reached the top of its calendar.  Most of the cases 
would have been timely, if expensively, settled as the parties 
squarely faced the risks and costs of having to prove their claims or 
defenses.  Also we cannot know how many claims would not have 
been pursued by lawyers or clients if they were given reason to 
foresee a risk that their allegations would be rigorously tested on the 
merits.  Those decrying the willingness of trial lawyers to represent 
                                                 
71. See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (upholding 
the Declaratory Judgment Act). 
72. E.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792). 
73. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the 
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000); Judith Resnick Mediating 
Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for 
Settlement, 2002 J. DISP. RES. 155 (2002). 
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claimants speculating that their lungs might prove to be worth a 
million dollars seldom observe the relation between those claims and 
the inaccessibility of a trial on the merits. 
Fourth, we might fairly conclude that individual claims 
arising from exposure to asbestos, however ripe for adjudication, are 
simply too complex to be suited to adjudication by law courts.  
Institutions committed to making decisions that are “just, speedy, 
and inexpensive”74 should not, if there is an alternative, be employed 
to resolve very complex scientific issues, nor asked to reconstruct 
decade-old events that seemed insignificant at the time to those who 
experienced them.  The costs and the secondary consequences of 
such litigation are excessive.  American courts do such things but 
only when there is no alternative and the enforcement of the law 
requires them.  In the asbestos cases, they were called on to decide a 
superabundance of such matters.  As noted, a special tribunal more 
like the industrial accident boards established in the early years of 
the 20th century existed as an alternative.   While such institutions 
have their faults, they are a means of reducing costs and delay in 
these complex cases, and of assuring a greater measure of even-
handedness.  This is so because administrators deciding such matters 
acquire a measure of expertise reducing their need to be educated 
repeatedly and at length on the complex issues of medical science.  
They would, therefore, have a much better shot of achieving the 
appropriate aims of civil litigation than judges and juries. 
Indeed, the presence of asbestos claims has likely contributed 
to a regrettable decline in the willingness and ability of American 
courts to address the merits of claims by providing a paradigm of 
cases in which addressing the merits is obviously a waste of scarce 
judicial resources.  At least in federal courts, it is hard to get any case 
to trial, or to get a hearing on appeal.75  Our courts are increasingly 
conducted as bureaucracies striving to avoid personal responsibility 
for decisions on the merits.  There are, of course, other causes 
contributing to this unfortunate result, but the asbestos crisis is 
among them. 
 
                                                 
74. As promised by FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
        75 See, e.g. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials 
and Related Matters in State and Federal Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459 
(2004) (“The portion of federal civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5 percent 
in 1962 to 1.8 percent in 2002, continuing a long historic decline.”) 
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V. THE LARGER QUESTION: IS LITIGATION THE RIGHT WAY TO 
ALLOCATE THE COSTS OF HEALTH CARE AND PHYSICAL 
DISABILITIES? 
 
Although the asbestos crisis is extraordinary, none of the 
problems identified in this article are unique to that form of 
litigation.  The crisis is, however, a stunning revelation of 
shortcomings in American government having deep roots and widely 
radiating consequences.   The shortcomings are associated with two 
broad and exceptional policies whose connection is infrequently 
observed.   One exceptional policy is America’s unique reliance on 
the “blame game” of tort law as a primary method of regulating 
business to protect the safety of workers and consumers by imposing 
ex post liability sufficient to deter heedlessness of risks.  The other 
exceptional policy is America’s extraordinary refusal to redistribute 
any of the costs and consequences of most personal injuries. 
Those who have been most alert to the pertinent 
shortcomings of the “blame game” have been the advocates of so-
called “tort reform” intended to shield business from claims of 
diverse sorts.  Tort reform advocates seldom acknowledge a need for 
alternative methods of regulating business to correct the innate 
indifference of large business management to the health and safety of 
remote workers and consumers, an indifference noted in the 18th 
century by no less an observer than Adam Smith.76  I have had 
several occasions in recent years to debate tort reformers.  It has 
been my habit to ask whether they were willing to submit to more 
vigorous ex ante administrative regulation of business decisions to 
prevent heedless risk-taking, regulation such as business is likely to 
experience in some other “developed” nations.77  I have never heard 
                                                 
76. After reflecting on accidents befalling distant others, “he would pursue 
his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease 
and tranquility as if no such accident had happened.”  ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY 
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 157 (Oxford ed. 1976) (1759). 
77. Of course, some risks are regulated ex ante by the Food and Drug 
Administration and by a few other agencies of government.  This has recently led 
to the effort of tort reformers to invoke the doctrine of federal preemption against 
state tort law, thereby precluding the allegedly redundant regulation ex post 
provided by tort law.  Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, 
N. Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A1.  The American Law Institute recently 
reconsidered the issue and supports the contrary provision.  RESTATEMENT 
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an affirmative answer to that question.  Tort reformers seek freedom 
to take risks with the consequence that persons other than themselves 
will be harmed.  
Nor does it seem that most tort reformers are much concerned 
about the unavailability of health care to accident victims who may 
be able to acquire it, if at all, only by blaming someone with a deeper 
pocket.  The asbestos crisis ought to suggest to them the possible 
wisdom of seeking health care reform as a means of achieving a tort 
reform objective.78  Although the effects of the asbestos problem on 
the insurance industry are transnational, the courts of no other nation 
have experienced a similar asbestos crisis.  This is not only because 
no other “developed” nation relies so heavily on tort law to provide 
ex post regulation of business risk taking, but it is also surely in part 
because other developed nations more freely redistribute the cost of 
accidents through public health care and disability programs, thus 
relieving the social and political pressures that produced the tort law 
of the United States. 
The major advantage of public health care and disability 
insurance is that a single payer of all costs is unconcerned with 
causation or blame.  Victims must prove their injuries to the 
satisfaction of a bureaucracy, but they need not pursue the intricate 
and subtle issues of cause and blame that have produced the asbestos 
crisis.  With a fully developed single-payer system in the United 
States, most injured persons would have no need for legal services to 
secure conventional health care or replacement for modest lost 
earnings.  Damages to be assessed in courts would as a result be 
                                                                                                                
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b) (1997).  A plausible case can be 
made for preemption if the regulatory agency has been fully informed of the risks, 
leaving it to private lawyers representing tort claimants to investigate whether full 
disclosure has been made.  See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance 
Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 
(2000) (summarizing and discussing the American Law Institute Reporter’s Study 
on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury).  Even if full disclosure is made, 
however, there is the serious problem that the regulatory agency itself may 
knowingly have concurred in allowing a risk to some citizens in order to diminish 
a greater risk to others; Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 
GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000) (discussing “the proper role of regulatory compliance as a 
strategy for constraining the traditional functions of tort law.”).   
78. Perhaps the issue is especially pertinent to the regulated risk-taking that 
deliberately incurs small risks to diminish larger ones.  Those spared the larger 
risks should compensate those on whom the smaller risks are imposed, but that is 
not the way regulation works in America.   
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greatly reduced.79  As in other developed nations, only those 
plaintiffs with substantial lost earnings or extraordinary health care 
needs would have claims worth pursuing in court.  It seems almost 
certain that compensation for pain and suffering would decline when 
triers of fact have no concern for assuring that the special damages 
are fully paid without need to share the proceeds with a lawyer.80  
Although more injured persons would receive care and support, few 
would have to share their compensation with lawyers.  With fewer 
tort claimants seeking less compensation, defendants would also 
experience reduced legal expenses.   Whereas it may now cost a total 
of $3.38 to put $1.00 in the hands of an asbestos victim,81 it would 
be reasonable to expect that such cost could be greatly reduced.82    
Independent of the legal costs saved by a single-payer 
system, one might also reasonably expect to reduce noticeably the 
cost of delivery of health care services.  Much of the costly health 
care and accident insurance industries could be expected to disappear 
as their services would be needed only by persons desiring 
extraordinary health care or insurance against the loss of substantial 
incomes.  Most businesses might expect to cease providing health 
care as a fringe benefit, thereby simplifying personnel management. 
These savings might be offset, possibly more than offset, by 
the cost of providing health care and disability insurance to citizens 
to whom such benefits are not presently available.  Persons with 
respiratory disorders would receive care even if they had no one to 
blame for their condition and no health insurance.   Businesses and 
individuals able to do so might have to pay higher taxes to enable 
government to bear that cost.  Whether the added tax burden would 
                                                 
79. At least this would be so if the collateral source rule on damages were 
made inapplicable, as seems entirely appropriate if the injured plaintiff had 
acquired the right to the benefits received without sacrifice on his or her part. 
80. Indeed, the availability of single-payer health care might justify 
legislative reconsideration of the measures of damages in personal injury cases. 
81. If the calculation of the National Association of Manufacturers is correct.  
See Statement of Engler, supra note 22. 
82. For comparison, the overhead cost of the Social Security Administration 
is less than three percent.  See Social Security Budget-2005 Budget Request, 
http://www.ssa.gov/budget/2005bud.html.  Overhead on Medicare is only 
marginally higher.  A single payer system would have responsibility for quality 
and cost controls that make none of the available comparisons apposite.  But a 
single payer system’s tasks would be infinitely simpler than those being performed 
by health care providers and insurers who are competing in a market of 
uninformed consumers and striving to avoid as many obligations as possible. 
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exceed the numerous savings incurred is not a prediction I am 
prepared to make.  Would it be seriously objectionable to redistribute 
the cost of health care for those to whom it is presently unavailable, 
as many nations do?  I leave the reader to answer that question with 
no more help than to say that the question is ripe for 
reconsideration.83 
Those reformers who are inclined to dismantle our system of 
ex post business regulation should at least acknowledge not only the 
deregulatory implications of tort reform, but its secondary 
consequences in placing added reliance on a health care system that 
already fails to attend the needs of millions of citizens. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
America’s experience with asbestos litigation should teach us 
to appreciate both the merits and the limits of our system of ex post 
regulation of business.  The civil trial is an important social and 
political institution on which the public depends for the protection of 
consumers, workers, and the environment.  Even Corporate America 
cannot long do without it.  But civil courts are not a system and 
cannot be made into a system fit to deal with individual matters as 
monstrously complex as the scientific issues to be resolved in 
asbestos cases.  Nor can courts usefully try cases before they arise; 
premature resolution invites the filing of dubious claims.  If 
legislatures insist on leaving such proliferations of complex disputes 
for the courts, they should be expected to provide enough judges, 
courtrooms, and juries to timely resolve disputes on their merits for 
the parties involved.  Finally, it is long past the time to reconsider a 
health care system that is heavily dependent on litigation as the path 
to medical treatment of sickness and injury. 
                                                 
83. BERTRAND DE JOUVENAL, THE ETHICS OF REDISTRIBUTION (1952) 
(providing an elegant modern statement of the case against redistribution). 
